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1. Introduction
Definitions: First we have to clearly define what we are talking about in the field of stem
cells. The zygote (fertilized egg cell) and the cells of the very young embryo up until the
eigth-cell stage are totipotent. This expression means that in the appropriate environment
(the uterus) these cells can form a complete and normal individual.
In contrast to this notion, the embryonal stem cells of mammals are derived from the in‐
ner  cell  mass  of  the  blastocyst,  a  slightly  later  stage  of  embryonal  development.  These
cells  are  no longer  totipotent,  but  pluripotent.  This  means that  those  cells,  if  artificially
inserted into a heterologous young embryo,  survive and give rise to all  tissues and cell
types  in  this  embryo including cells  of  the  germ line,  thus creating a  chimeric  embryo,
which consists of two types of cells that are genetically different form each other. Embry‐
onal stem cells (ES cells) display a few properties that make them highly interesting for
regenerative medicine: they can be grown and multiplied indefinitely in the presence of
the appropriate “factors” (proteins, growth factors, small molecules) without major genet‐
ic changes and without loss of pluripotency, and they can be modified by genetic engi‐
neering  without  major  chromosomal  changes  and  without  using  viral  vehicles  [1].  The
latter property is essential for the future application of those cells for gene therapy. Mam‐
malian  ES  cell  technology  was  first  developed  in  the  mouse  model  system  beginning
with  the  landmark  paper  of  Martin  [2].  Human  ES  cells  (hESC)  were  first  isolated  by
Thomson [3]. The patenting of the isolation of hESC (the so-called WARF patents) led to
a huge public discussion regarding the moral and legal implications of those patents [4].
Ultimately  the  US supreme court  acknowledged those  patents  as  being legal,  while  the
Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that no procedures can be patented, which
use  embryo  research,  i.e.  the  destruction  of  human embryos  [81].  However,  human in‐
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duced pluripotent stem cells  (hiPSC) can now be created from differentiated adult  cells,
like  dermal  fibroblasts  (see  below),  which  according  to  biochemical  criteria  (transcrip‐
tome,  proteome),  are very near identical  to  hESC [5].  It  has been shown, in the mouse,
that  not  only  by  biochemical  criteria,  but  also  in  terms of  the  developmental  potential,
mouse iPSC are identical with mouse ESC [6].
In contrast to the pluripotent ES cells, somatic stem cells are multipotent, meaning that their
developmental potential is rather limited to a number of related cell types. For instance, the
well-known hematopoietic stem cells of the red bone marrow can generate in vivo all cells
that are found in the blood of humans. Until recently it was believed that this commitment
to a number of related developmental fates is absolute, however it is now known that even
in normal individuals in vivo, a low percentage of bone marrow stem cells can become quite
different cells [7], and, to give just one example, fibroblasts can be induced, by expression of
two to three transcription factors, to become bona fide heart muscle cells [8].
Currently,  an  ever  increasing  number  of  papers  on  hiPSC (human induced  pluripotent
stem cells) are being published as documented by indexing services such as PubMed. In
vitro  methods  of  creating  hiPSC  from  the  easily  available  dermal  fibroblasts  were  first
described in 2006 and 2007 [9,  10].  Due to  longer experience with the stem cells  of  the
mouse and due to ethical and legal considerations, there is still  a technical gap between
procedures  applicable  to  mouse  iPSC  and  hiPSC.  Since  2008,  a  nearly  exponential  in‐
crease in papers dealing with hiPSC is appearing and well over 1000 papers are now be‐
ing  published  every  year.  Many  of  those  papers  mention  that  hiPSCs  in  contrast  to
hESCs (human embryonal stem cells)  are considered to be ethically acceptable while an
intensive debate was and is going on concerning the ethical implications of hESCs [4, 11];
(see below in the next part of this chapter).
Another unsolved probem in stem cell therapy is “homing” of the repaired cells to the “ni‐
che” in the body where they are needed and can function. Only in exceptional cases does
homing occur automatically (bone marrow stem cells in the mouse), but in other cases
(brain) the cells must be directly injected into the relevant area. Modern nanotechnological
methods may be helpful for this immense task in the future [12].
What we would like to do in the current paper is (paragraph 2) to give a very short over‐
view of the present and the anticipated future status of hiPSCs and their use in biomedicine
including the new topic of differentiated cell plasticity [7]; (paragraph 3) to explain the ethi‐
cal arguments that were brought forward concerning hESCs; and (paragraph 4) to discuss
some remaining ethical arguments concerning hiPSCs with special emphasis on the argu‐
ment of complicity [13].
2. Short overview of the present and the anticipated future status of
hiPSCs
Stem cell and related techniques, such as direct reprogramming of differentiated cells, of‐
fer an immense promise for the future of regenerative medicine using stem cell  therapy
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and/or a combination of stem cell and gene therapy. This promise is, as we now know, a
realistic  one,  but  the  enormous  technical  difficulties  and  the  requirements  imposed  by
clinical  safety  (for  instance  concerning the  cancer  risk)  are  not  easily  overcome and we
estimate  that  many  years  will  pass  before  these  methods  become  clinical  routine  for
many diseases. Presently, very few clinical examples exist that successfully show the effi‐
cacy of stem cell and gene therapy [14].
The theoretical and biological basis for the techniques to be discussed here are, among oth‐
ers, the fact that somatic cells of animals (and of the human animal, of course) contain the
same genetic complement as the fertilized egg cell (the zygote). This means that every gene
needed for the complete development of an individual is present in every somatic cell of a
mature individual. The direct and undisputable proof for this is shown by the cloning of an‐
imals [15]. However a similar result was obtained decades before “Dolly the sheep” by John
Gurdon [16], working with frogs. Therefore, the phenotypic differences between different
somatic cells of an adult individual must depend on differences in gene expression, or to use
a modern term on the “epigenome” of those cells. At present Bio-medicine is, at an increas‐
ing speed, discovering methods to change this differentiated state from one well defined cell
type (say fibroblasts) to another (say, for example, a specific subtype of neurons needed for
an individual patient) [7]. Previously, the differentiated state of somatic cells was believed to
be immutable, at least in vivo, but this paradigm clearly is no longer true. Why are such pro‐
cedures needed in regenerative medicine? This question leads us to the genetic differences
between human individuals and the immunological incompatibility between humans who
are not monozygotic twins. For reasons that are not entirely clear to scientists who study the
evolutionary history of mankind, it appears that differences in the antigens of the HLA type
(human lymphocyte antigen; displayed on cell surfaces) occur between any two humans
and are large enough to lead to immunological attack (host versus graft disease) after the
transplantation of cells and organs. Therefore, it is desirable to use autologous (HLA-com‐
patible) cells for therapy, which raise no immune response and make immune suppression
of the patient superfluous. In organ transplantation, this problem is generally overcome (al‐
though, perhaps, insufficiently) by the pharmacological immune suppression of the patient
who receives a transplant. For the combination of gene and cell therapy, the idea is to use
autologous cells which, however, must conform to strict safety standards before a clinical
trial is granted by the authorities and can be started. There are also a number of unresolved
problems if the autologous cells to be transplanted need a genetic “repair” because the pa‐
tient to be treated suffers from a genetic disease whose underlying mutation is known and
will be corrected by sophisticated genetic engineering as is applicable to human cells.
Genome editing: For several reasons which have to do with differences that exist between
mouse and human iPSCs, as well as with the low success rate of current methods for ge‐
nome editing [17], the originally developed ingenious method of selection and counter-se‐
lection in mouse ESCs [1] seems not to be suitable for a safe repair of known mutations in
genes of a patient suffering from a particular and genetically well-known inherited disease.
Ideally, the presence of the mutation in question should be known by DNA sequencing of
the relevant part (or the whole genome) of the patient. Instead, the scientific community is
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now seeking to improve the efficiency of point-directed genome editing to clinically accepta‐
ble levels [17]. The cells to be used for these procedures should be as close as possible to the
original patient-derived cells, avoiding prolonged proliferation of hiPSCs. The tools that
must be developed to achieve this are the so-called ZNF-nucleases (zinc finger nucleases)
based on a concept by Kim [18] which can produce a double strand break at a precisely de‐
fined point in the whole human genome [17]. This double strand break is then recombino‐
genic enough to lead to homologous recombination with a co-transformed plasmid that
carries the corrected DNA sequence [19]. Alternatively, the TALEN strategy can be used
[20]. One problem that must be overcome here in the future, is the limited capacity for pro‐
liferation of differentiated cells and their general reluctance to be transformed by plasmids,
which is true for instance for dermal fibroblasts.
Cancer risk: One of the greatest obstacles that must be overcome before stem cell therapy
can become clinical routine is the inherent cancer risk conferred by both ESCs and iPSCs.
In one of the very few and frequently-quoted clinical trials for gene therapy of X-SCID,
some of the affected and essentially cured children came down with leukemia.  The rea‐
son for the cancer incidence in this case was the lack of control of the point of integra‐
tion of the viral vector used to introduce the genetically corrected gene sequence, which
was  inserted  at  locations  in  the  genome  where  it  caused  leukemia  [21,  22].  However,
even ESCs or iPSCs which are not genetically manipulated, by their “stemness” alone can
cause  cancer.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  embryonal  stem  cells  were  first  discovered
during the study of teratocarcinomas and one of the most important decisive traits  was
the ability to form teratocarcinomas in nude mice [2]. Therefore, for some time, the idea
was to re-differentiate the hiPSCs to the needed cells after genetic manipulation and then
purify  these  cells  until  they  were  essentially  free  of  remaining  stem  cells  [23].  This
proved to be a difficult job. The other solution to this problem is to directly produce the
desired cell  type using the  action of  transcription factors  and small  molecule  signalling
substances without ever going through a stage of stem cells [7]. This way is very promis‐
ing but also not yet matured enough for clinical practice.
In summary, we may say that it is still too early to decide in which direction future cell and
gene therapy will go. For some time, hESCs, and even more importantly, hiPSCs will be
needed for biomedical research. This is not restricted to gene therapy and cell therapy with‐
out genetic corrections (as in the case of acquired diseases), but equally is needed for the es‐
tablishment of disease models and for drug testing, which is, however, not the topic of this
chapter. For all of those reasons, we think it is timely to discuss the ethical implications of
stem cell research.
3. Ethical arguments brought forward concerning hESCs
The central ethical concern that is raised by production and use of hESC is the question con‐
cerning the moral status of human embryos. The derivation of hESCs from early embryos
(blastocysts) is, in practice, necessarily connected with their destruction. Because of that, we
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have to ask, if a human embryo is recognized as a being endowed with human dignity and a
right to life comparable to that of born human beings. Destruction for research purposes
raises the serious ethical issues of exploitation, instrumentalisation and killing of human be‐
ings. Concerning both ethical issues, human dignity and the prohibition of killing, in re‐
gards to human embryos in spite of the long discussions an ethical consensus is nowhere in
sight. In the following passage some explanations will be given regarding the fundamental
question of the moral status of embryos [12, 24-31].
Further intensively discussed issues in hESC research are research cloning (the procurement
of embryos for research purposes by nuclear transfer in enucleated egg cells) and the dona‐
tion of egg-cells. For a long time, the development of therapeutic applications seemed to in‐
volve research cloning (also called “therapeutic cloning”). Research cloning of humans
would represent a clear instance of exploiting humans solely for the benefit and interests of
others. Establishing this technique in humans requires further destructive embryo research
and is feared to prepare a slippery slope for reproductive cloning of humans, which is gen‐
erally considered as ethically unacceptable [32-37].
If this way to therapeutic applications had succeeded, the demand for a high number of do‐
nated egg-cells would have been a consequence. For women, egg donation causes health
risks and the danger of commercial exploitation. The alternative to produce hybrids of hu‐
mans and animals is also seen as offending human dignity [38]. These ethical problems have
lost some urgency, since this strategy doesn’t seem to be succeeding. The fundamental ques‐
tion of the moral status of human embryos is still a matter of open discussion in ethics.
3.1. The discussion about the moral status of early human embryos
hESCs needed for research are obtained from different sources that entail a different ethi‐
cal  evaluation.  While extraction of  stem cells  from adults,  from umbilical  cord blood or
from aborted foetuses,  is  considered to  be ethically  acceptable  under certain conditions,
the  procurement  of  hESCs  is  confronted  with  ethical  objections,  since  it  is  necessarily
connected with the destruction of human embryos. It is a kind of consuming embryo re‐
search. The possible sources are already established embryonic stem cell lines, supernum‐
erary embryos from IVF-treatment,  embryos produced specifically for research purposes
or even embryos cloned by nuclear transfer as a logical consequence in case of successful
therapeutic applications.
Different regulations worldwide and in the EU, as well as an on-going discussion about the
funding of research projects are taking place [12, 39]. As a minimal consensus, creation of
embryos solely for research purposes is forbidden in the European Council’s Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Appli‐
cation of Biology and Medicine [32].
By obtaining hESCs from the inner cell mass of a blastocyst for research purposes begin‐
ning human life is destroyed. The embryo is obviously a human being, a member of the
human species,  has an individual genome, neither identical  with that of the mother nor
that of the father, in contrast to other human tissue, can develop into the full shape of a
Ethical Considerations on Stem Cell Research
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/54375
607
human being (totipotent) and has a small, but realistic chance to be born and live its own
life.
Since hESC research, on the one hand, gives hope in terms of therapeutic applications for
severe diseases and, on the other hand, is connected with the destruction of embryos as nec‐
essary means to this end, two ethically high standing aims are opposed. Basic research (free‐
dom of research) and the hopes connected with therapeutic application (principle of
beneficence, value of health and life of patients) are confronted with the respect for human
dignity and the right to life of human embryos. The question is: May human embryos be
produced and destroyed as biological material for research and therapy or even for industri‐
al applications?
In relation to already born humans we would never accept such destruction or killing no
matter how great the benefit for research or therapy could be. For born humans there is a
strong agreement: They have moral status and equal human dignity independent of their ac‐
tual abilities or disabilities. The statement about the moral status is a value judgement. At
first it means that humans have intrinsic value. If the moral status of humans is determined
in the tradition of the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, with the term "dignity", an un‐
conditional value is proclaimed, which goes beyond the intrinsic value of non-human beings
and can't be balanced with the benefit of others. Kant makes this clear in a well-known
quote regarding his categorical imperative: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an
end, but always at the same time as an end.” [40, 41].
The central consequences of the recognition of equal human dignity are the fundamental
equality of all humans with regard to this dignity, the same right to welfare and the prohibi‐
tion of arbitrary instrumentalisation and exploitation for the purposes of others. Killing for
research purposes definitely falls under this prohibition. Whether and to which degree these
moral demands are already valid in the early stages of development, is a matter of the con‐
troversy concerning the ontological, moral, and legal status of human embryos [36, 42-47].
It is therefore clear why this discussion is unavoidable. Before discussing freedom of re‐
search,  hopes  for  therapeutic  applications,  and  different  possibilities  of  regulations,  the
question,  of  whether or not  embryos,  in an ethical  respect,  belong to the community of
beings  deserving  equal  and  impartial  consideration,  must  be  answered.  Is  impartiality
(the “golden rule”), to be applied even to embryos, or not at all, or merely in a gradually
weaker sense?
These issues were discussed extensively in the last decades and, regrettably, have not ach‐
ieved a consensus. Here we will shortly explain the general lines of reasoning. Summarized
in a simplified overview there are three types of answers: (a) Personalistic positions main‐
tain human dignity and a right to life of human embryos. (b) Non-personalistic positions de‐
ny that and impute to embryos a status similar to human tissues or cadavers. A third group
proposes to find a kind of middle position by giving several types of (c) relative or gradual‐
istic answers.
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a. Personalistic positions claim that already the embryo must be respected as a person
and, therefore, has a right to life in the earliest stage and also outside the mother [42,
48-52].
The reason for personal positions is a certain view of the embryonic development. The de‐
velopment from fertilization up to birth is understood as a continuous development (argu‐
ment of continuity) of something that is, basically, already present, and under natural
conditions, has the inner capability of further development into a fully evolved person (ar‐
gument of potentiality) and remains the same being (argument of identity). The embryo is not a
preliminary stage of a human but a human in the earliest stage. Although it doesn't have the
actual abilities of a person (self-consciousness, reason, freedom), the embryo must be treated
as a person because of its inner potential to develop these qualities and, under normal cir‐
cumstances, become such a person.
This reasoning can be combined with two additional arguments. The species argument points
out that the embryo’s membership in the human species is a biological fact. Biological facts
alone are not sufficient reasonings for moral judgement. However, the argument may serve
as a determination of the scope, the application area of dignity: All members of the human
species are included. Being a member of the human species and being endowed with digni‐
ty and certain rights is actually coinciding with each other. Therefore, the species-member‐
ship suffices to claim the corresponding rights. If this argument also applies to embryos,
then this is controversial and presupposes the first three arguments. The four previously
mentioned arguments are often described as a "SKIP-quadrology": species, continuity, iden‐
tity, potentiality [44].
Sometimes another argument is added in respect to the remaining uncertainties of empirical
knowledge, as well as philosophical interpretation of early embryonic development. The
precautionary principle generally calls for a careful proceeding in small steps and imposes the
burden of proof on those, who want to change existing attitudes and moral norms. They
have to offer evidence, not those who defend them. According to this position, doubts about
being a person may not lead to an arbitrary restriction of human dignity. No man is subject
to the constraint of having to justify his existence. This corresponds to the basic structure of
the human dignity argument, which should, primarily, serve as protection of the weak
against any kind of discrimination. Everyone is basically interested in safe conditions, in
which she/he need not fear being excluded from the common protection area due to some
actual lack of abilities or characteristics [45, 53].
The consequences of the personal position are unambiguous: Destroying embryos for re‐
search purposes and research cloning is forbidden. Freedom of research is subjected to mo‐
ral limits. Therapies, which cost the lives of other humans, are not acceptable. Even the hope
for therapy for serious diseases is no adequate reason for the specific production and de‐
struction of human embryos. Nevertheless, each mentioned argument is subjected to criti‐
cism and the personal position hasn't turned out to provide a consensus [42, 43].
b. Non-personalistic positions deny what personalistic positions proclaim.
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A far-reaching objection to the personal position is, for example, represented by the
Australian moral philosopher, Peter Singer. He denies the human dignity of embryos,
foetuses and even newborn children due to a very narrow concept of personality based
solely on actual abilities: “My suggestion, then, is that we accord the life of a fetus no
greater value than the life of a nonhuman animal at a similar level of rationality, self-
consciousness, awareness, capacity to feel, etc. Since no fetus is a person, no fetus has
the same claim to life as a person.” [54]. For these positions there is, in principle, no ob‐
jection to hESC research as long as the rights of the donors of gametes or embryos are
respected.
c. Gradualistic positions try to find a way of maintaining special respect for human em‐
bryos and restrictions of research purposes and, at the same time, allowing research for
high standing objectives. They are quite frequently supported [29, 31, 55-58].
According to this kind of reasoning full protection of human embryos starts at a later
stage of development. The time before the moral status is gradually weakened, but not
reduced to that of some other human tissue. Most frequently nidation, or the end of the
possibility of twin formation, is seen as the relevant moment. When nidation is com‐
plete, the embryos’ chance of survival increases significantly. Sometimes other stages of
development are argued as being relevant e.g. the beginning of the first nerve cells in
the fifth or sixth week. This is seen as relevant, if the ability to feel pain is seen as a deci‐
sive ethical quality.
Finally, there are suggestions in which the moral status of embryos isn't differentiated de‐
pending on the stage of development, but according to the context and target of its creation.
In such an “extrinsic” determination of the moral status surplus embryos from IVF-treat‐
ment and research embryos don't have any dignity, because they lack the necessary condi‐
tions for further development, or according to their creators’ intentions, never should be
born at all, while embryos produced for IVF-treatment already have this dignity in a very
early stage, since the intention and hope is that they be born [24, 59, 60]. In this way of rea‐
soning, dignity and the right to life are conferred or awarded by society. Dignity depends on
the allocation to the research department or the IVF department. Some authors turn this rea‐
soning into the field of metaethics and proclaim, that human dignity is always invented and
awarded by society and not based on an objective moral reality [58].
If the protection of some early stage or research embryos or surplus embryos is weakened,
the interests and well-being of embryos and patients can be balanced against each other and
destruction of embryos can be justified for high standing objectives. Strict embryo protection
is argued to be valid for later stages and a clear limit seems possible for the time being. Nev‐
ertheless this reasoning is not free of some arbitrariness and, if the restrictions are sustained,
one can fear for the time, when interests for research with later stages of embryonic develop‐
ment will emerge. In principle, everything seems justifiable, if dignity depends on society or
the intentions of the embryo’s creators.
Some authors try to justify hESC research without weakening the moral status of embryos
through a special reasoning within the prohibition of killing [61, 62]. In an opinion of the
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Austrian Bioethics Commission these attempts are summarized as follows: “The first argu‐
ment chooses the comparison with the removal of organs from brain dead patients. This
does not violate the prohibition of killing nor the prohibition of the complete instrumentali‐
sation of a human life that is derived from the concept of human dignity. Even less should
the use of fertilised egg cells at a stage in which one cannot speak of either an organ or brain
development be rejected as such on ethical reasons. The second argument compares the ob‐
taining of embryonic stem cells from surplus embryos with the medical use of tissue from
aborted foetuses, which can be ethically justified in so far as the abortion was not performed
for the purpose of obtaining foetal tissue. Both lines of argument imply that at the moment it
is no longer used for reproduction, the embryo created in vitro undergoes a change of status
that is equivalent to that of a person's transition from life into death. Even if one wishes to
accord the fertilised egg cell personhood, this does not mean that there is an irresolvable
conflict of values between the protection of life for the embryo and the freedom of research
in the service of present and future patients”[31]. These arguments cannot be discussed here
[63, 64]. The intention to escape the endless discussion about the moral status of embryos is
clever, the hope to prevent the weakening of the human dignity argument may be honoura‐
ble, but as a matter of fact, the relevant embryos are not dead prior to the destruction for
research. One might wonder, what results this kind of reasoning could have, when applied
to disabled persons or patients at the end of life, which could also be said to have no chance
for further development (a logical version of the slippery slope-argument).
3.2. Results of the status debate
Each modification of ethical reasoning and central moral attitudes must be paid attention to
in terms of consistency, rationality and possible side effects for other areas of life. This ex‐
amination of the arguments is sometimes more important than the solution itself. Bad argu‐
ments are counterproductive, promote distrust against ethical reasoning and science in the
long run, and weaken their aptitude to give orientation. The first task of ethics is the effort to
obtain good reasons, not fast answers [65]. The personalistic positions are consistent in the
protection of the right to life, but have trouble convincing society and researchers. The non-
personalistic positions will not find approval because of the openly declared consequences
for new-born children, disabled, or dying persons. The middle positions try to release re‐
search from some ethical boarders, without damaging the conviction of equal human digni‐
ty. But their methods of reasoning don't really convince and, in the long run, leave open too
many options.
Nevertheless two fundamental considerations seem to support maintaining a rejection of the
destruction of human embryos for research purposes:
a. If someone wants to justify hESC research, either within a limited extent or up to re‐
search cloning, she/he must be able to give convincing arguments, why embryos might
be treated in a different way than born humans. This seems to be impossible without
weakening or denying the moral status of early human embryos. This method of rea‐
soning possesses danger of weakening the protection of the human dignity in general. If
the coincidence of human species and human dignity is given up and exchanged for a
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dignity awarded by society, corresponding to actual research interests, serious doubts
may arise, whether the desired protection standard can be maintained in other areas of
life, e.g. for coma patients, disabled people or new born children.
b. hESC research including destruction of human embryos is not without alternatives. The
promised therapeutic applications of hESC research are still lacking, while research in
adult stem cells and hiPSC research seem very promising and are reducing the ethical
objections. When opposition to hESC research is still accused of impeding research and
preventing necessary new therapies, this could also be seen as a clever policy of small
steps to deceive moral convictions. Also other objectives are highly relevant, for exam‐
ple industrial applications in toxicity testing with human embryos as a substitute for
animal experiments: “These cell lines may provide more clinically relevant biological
systems than animal models for drug testing and are therefore expected to contribute to
the development of safer and more effective drugs for human diseases and ultimately
to reduce the use of animals. They also offer the possibility to develop better in vitro
models to enhance the hazard identification of chemicals. It is possible that these appli‐
cations will turn out to be the major medical impact of human ES cell research...” [66].
4. Remaining ethical arguments concerning hiPSCs with special
emphasis on the argument of complicity in another’s wrongdoing and
double effect reasoning
If  it  is  true that successful therapeutic applications are more likely to result  from hiPSC
research than from hESC research, ethical problems would be reduced significantly [4, 26,
67,  68].  Research cloning could be avoided.  It  would never be necessary for therapeutic
application.  hESC-research  would,  at  least,  be  reduced  to  the  domain  of  basic  research
and control  experiments.  For this remaining need it  seems realistic  that already existing
cell-lines  will  be  sufficient  [12].  In  this  case,  the  destruction  of  human embryos  for  re‐
search is completely avoidable in the future and even the destruction of surplus human
embryos may be unnecessary.
Nevertheless, even in hiPSC-research, some ethical issues remain and are in need of inten‐
sive consideration:
Can the distinction between hESC and hiPSC be explained in a consistent and convincing
way? Is it possible to find a reliable delimitation between pluripotent and totipotent stem
cells? Is it possible to prevent the production of germ cells out of hiPSCs, as well as their use
to create new research-embryos [26]?
Is the assumption that hESC-research is completely dispensable, or will be after a period of
time, justified, or is it only a means of sedating the conscience? Some scientist say, that is too
early to decide [11]. Even a temporal limited "exception", or a limited number cannot be seen
as an exception of ethical principles but must be justified. If further destruction of a limited
number of human embryos for research purposes would be necessary during a transition
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period, some ethicists argue for the use of surplus embryos from IVF-treatment [31]. The
ethical objections were indicated above. This way is surely not acceptable, if, according to
our appraisal, existing cell lines are sufficient. If not, the use of surplus embryos needs to be
justified in a consistent way without denying the human dignity of embryos and without
opening the way to the creation of research embryos on demand and even for non-therapeu‐
tic applications.
How can the cell donors’ right to voluntary and informed consent, as well as the protection
of personal data, especially in the case of application of hiPSCs as disease models, be guar‐
anteed? How can the relevant questions of property rights and patent law be solved [69]?
Even hiPSC-research is, in several ways, confronted with the ethical problem of “complicity
in others’ wrongdoing”: How can someone consistently reject the destruction of human em‐
bryos and, at the same time, use the result of former destructive research [13, 47, 70, 71]?
Katrien Devolder draws attention to this problem of complicity. She contradicts the opinion,
that hiPSC research is ethically correct, while hESC research is wrong because it involves de‐
struction of human embryos: “Many who object to human embryonic stem cell (hESC) re‐
search because they believe it involves complicity in embryo destruction have welcomed
induced pluripotent stem cell (iPSC) research as an ethical alternative. This opinion article
aims to show that complicity arguments against hESC research are prima facie inconsistent
with accepting iPSC research as it is currently done.” [13].
In this passage we would like to scrutinize her theses and her suggestions for a solution. We
are convinced that the problem of complicity is no obstacle for hiPSC research, if certain re‐
quirements are met.
4.1. Double effect reasoning
In theological and philosophical ethics, problems like this (cooperation with another’s sin,
“cooperatio in malo”) can be discussed in relation to the so-called “principle of an action
with double effect”, in brief “principle of double effect“, or “double-effect reasoning”
[72-74]. In this principle, a distinction is drawn between direct consequences of an action
and side effects, which are only indirectly wanted or accepted as unavoidable. The principle
wasn’t interpreted and used uniformly and has undergone some changes. In philosophical
and theological ethics, it is relevant in two different contexts. The first and original context is
the question of cooperating with the sin of another person. In these cases, the wrongness of
the action is presupposed and the question concerns only the legitimacy, or culpability of
the cooperation. Furthermore the principle of double effect is relevant in the context of some
specific moral norms, such as the prohibition of killing to determine moral rightness or
wrongness. In these cases it is a principle of restrictive interpretation of deontological moral
norms [75]. This is an issue of high complexity and not necessary for the question of com‐
plicity. In the first context, the principle draws one's attention to several relevant aspects
that may be helpful for our question of complicity in hESC and hiPSC research.
The basis of the argument of complicity with another’s wrongdoing is the estimation that
somebody, who cooperates in, or profits from the morally reprehensable actions of other
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persons, makes himself responsible in a certain way as an accomplice. “Complicity” means a
culpable cooperation in the ethically wrong action of another person. The conviction that we
are responsible not only for the immediate results of our behaviour, but also for the influ‐
ence we exert by our behaviour on convictions and behaviour of others in the long run, as
far as this is foreseeable, is fundamental.
Just as the demands of morality are aimed at the inner attitude as well as the outer ac‐
tions of man, accusations of complicity are not only aimed at a voluntary and deliberate
cooperation in the wrong actions of others,  but also at inadequate attitudes towards the
wrong actions of others. Our inner disposition, our fundamental attitude, our character is
the central content of our moral obligation. Morality primarily consists in the fundamen‐
tal  attitude of impartial  benevolence,  in the respect for the equal dignity of all  humans.
Motives cannot be recognized directly but only inferred from our behaviour. Sometimes
adequate symbolic actions can help to express the inner attitudes and prevent misunder‐
standings. Symbolic actions partly get credibility by the costs they cause and by the dis‐
advantages somebody is ready to accept [76].
This effort especially is necessary if somebody profits from the wrong actions of others and
thus, gives the impression of approval or inner consent of these actions. This can even be the
case, if one wasn't involved in the wrong actions at all. The use of research results from mo‐
rally reprehensible experiments in the past [77] without an explicit dissociation can give the
impression of lacking sensibility and missing respect for the victims or even the impression
of an inner consent, of condoning or justifying these actions. If there are scientific reasons to
use the results, the rejection of these crimes must be articulated by explicitly remembering
the victims and condemning the crimes.
Complicity with another’s wrongdoing can happen in different constellations. In the tradi‐
tion of moral theology, different types of cooperation with the sin of another one were dis‐
tinguished and relevant distinctions were made for the degree of guilt [74, 78, 79].
In any case, the rejection of a sin, a willingly performed wrong action of another person, is
required. Complicity, as an inner consent when another one’s sin "is wanted as such", is
called “formal” cooperation and is always wrong. Even an implicit inner consent is seen as a
formal cooperation, especially in the case of serious offenses. If the inner consent is missing
because the cooperation happens involuntarily or without knowledge, this is called a “mate‐
rial” cooperation. However, this kind of cooperation requires a justification, but, in contrast
to a formal cooperation, this is possible. According to traditional arguments a material coop‐
eration is permitted, if the other’s sin is "wanted only indirectly” and the action corresponds
to the rules of the “principle of double effect".
Within the principle of double effect, a distinction is drawn between direct consequences of
an action and side effects, which are only indirectly wanted, or accepted as unavoidable.
While direct cooperation is regarded as forbidden, the indirect one can be justified by ade‐
quately important, so-called proportionate reasons for accepting the others’ sin. In this way,
teleological reasoning, on the basis of balancing good and bad consequences, is made possi‐
ble for the indirect causation of the others’ sin. Nevertheless, this remains excluded for a di‐
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rect causation or a direct intention, in which the wrong action is intended itself (per se), or as
a means to an end [80]. In these cases the sin must be seen as directly intended. As a mini‐
mum for speaking of an indirect causation of an evil, it was demanded that good and bad
consequences must result from the action "at least equal immediately" [73, 74, 78].
In casuistry, further types of a “material” cooperation were distinguished: A positive cooper‐
ation by an active action is more serious than a negative cooperation by omission of an ac‐
tion. An immediate cooperation is more serious than a mediate. A near cooperation is more
serious than a remote one. Necessary cooperation, without which the wrong action of anoth‐
er one wouldn't have happened at all, is worse than cooperation, when it would have been
performed anyway. A direct intention could be suspected, the more immediate and more
near one’s own action is connected with another one’s sin and the more probably the other
one wouldn't sin without this cooperation. Here the principle includes a difficult question:
Does the indirectness and justifiability of complicity primarily depend on the causal proxim‐
ity, or on the probability of another person’s wrong action? Is it really less problematic to
promote a wrong action with high probability, if the number of mediating instances is in‐
creased? In the theological tradition there was no agreement on this matter. According to a
teleological method, responsibility refers to all foreseeable consequences that can be influ‐
enced by one’s actions. In this point of view, probability is more important than proximity.
For the credibility of the inner consent, proximity may be the greater problem.
These distinctions show the difficulties in dissociating oneself consistently from another’s
wrongdoing while cooperating or profiting from it. While the distinction between formal
and material cooperation is a clear alternative, the distinctions of types of material coopera‐
tion seems in real life often to be a matter of degree. Al least one could say, that the effort to
make one’s own inner rejection of anothers’ wrongdoing credible to other people is greater,
the more a cooperation is near, immediately and necessarily.
The  principle  of  double  effect  includes  at  least  three  relevant  aspects  that  may help  to
evaluate the problem of complicity in hESC and iPSC research: (a) In any case, the rejec‐
tion of another one’s action, which one determines as ethically wrong, is required as mat‐
ter  of  inner  consistency.  (b)  A  material  cooperation  can,  nevertheless,  be  ethically
justified,  if  intention  and  causal  relation  can  be  seen  as  indirect,  which  is  sometimes
clearly identifiable, but is often a matter of degree. (c) In any case, a proportionate reason
for accepting the others’ sin must be given. Additionally sometimes symbolic actions will
be necessary to maintain one’s credibility.
4.2. Complicity according to Devolder
Devolder’s statements to complicity partly correspond with these arguments. She introduces
the following variants [13]:
1. "Causally contributing": “When I induce or encourage you, or provide you with the
means to commit a murder, and as a result you commit it, I am complicit in that mur‐
der.” In these cases, the other’s wrong action is also the result of one’s own action.
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2. "Promoting wrongdoing through increasing demand for embryonic stem cell lines":
“One can be complicit in wrongdoing by increasing the likelihood of that wrongdoing
(or future instances of it) in certain ways, even if one does not in fact cause it.”
3. "Promoting wrongdoing through altering attitudes to embryo destruction": Further
ways of promoting wrongdoing “include condoning a wrong or fostering more permis‐
sive social attitudes towards it.” Profiting from the use of the results of a wrong action
can awake the assumption that one excuses this action. This can in the long run weaken
social attitudes and promote wrong behaviour.
4. "Implicitly condoning wrongdoing and disrespecting its victims": Complicity can also
be supposed, independent of the consequences, if an implicit excuse of a wrong action,
or disrespect towards the victims seems to be expressed.
In the terminology of theological ethics, paradigms 1-3 refer to different forms of material
cooperation. The first includes examples of direct and indirect cooperation specified as near
forms of cooperation. Category 2 and 3 are examples of mediate cooperation of a more re‐
mote type, the acceptance of a wrong action as a side effect. One’s own action is not suffi‐
cient for the realization of this side effect, but increases its probability in connection with
others. In contrast to Devolder, this can also be seen as a kind of causation, but an indirect
one. In Example 3, the side effect is a problematic change of social attitudes. This effect is
even more remote. The connection is a very complex one. It is unquestionable that research
often changes social attitudes. Researchers should think about such consequences, which oc‐
cur as a result of their work. But they aren't alone responsible for it and their actions are sel‐
dom a sufficient condition for a change of social attitudes. Category 4 refers to the
appearance of an inner consent, which is called an implicit formal cooperation. Either the
actual inner attitude or the publicly noticeable expression is not adequate.
4.2.1. Devolder’s criticism of hESC research
According to Devolder hESC research is confronted with the problem of complicity even if
researchers use already existing cell lines and don’t themselves destroy human embryos.
Even if there is no direct causal contribution, they contribute to an “increasing demand for
embryonic cell lines” [13, p 2176] and, in this way, promote the likelihood of “further em‐
bryo destruction” [13, p 2176]. At least at a collective level, this mediate and remote effect is
a reality. Presupposition for this criticism is that destroying human embryos is determined
as ethically not justified.
A strategy to prevent this contribution is “separating the use of hESCs from their derivation
by instituting a cut-off date” [13, p 2176]. This method was used by the jurisdiction in Ger‐
many when trying to deal with the problem in 2002. When the cut-off date was moved in
2007, the credibility of the proclaimed objection to the destruction of embryos was damaged.
If the shift of a cut-off date can be anticipated, contribution to an increasing demand is not
prevented any more. Devolder emphasizes, that even when using hESCs produced before a
cut-off date successful research may promote the destruction of embryos in less restrictive
countries. As a counter-argument, she points out that hESC lines are mostly derived from
Pluripotent Stem Cells616
discarded IVF embryos. Since they are available in a large number, hESC research will not
increase the likelihood of embryo-destruction in any way. Of course this objection presup‐
poses the acceptability of the destruction of surplus IVF embryos, which is an open discus‐
sion. In addition to this, the question arises, of whether or not research interests truly have
no effect on the production of surplus IVF embryos [71].
Furthermore, Devolder indicates complicity by contributing to altering attitudes in society,
changing moral beliefs, legislation or incentives. In this way, the potential benefits of hESC
research for many people and the good reputation of biomedical research in general may
weaken efforts to reduce the number of embryos discarded in IVF.
Finally, hESC research is accused of “implicitly condoning wrongdoing and disrespecting its
victims”. If the destruction of embryos is evaluated as a kind of wrongdoing, it is inconsis‐
tent and not credible, when researchers, who benefit from it, would regret or try to distance
themselves from the practice of destruction of embryos. By using the stem cell lines, they
seem to condone the way, they were obtained.
4.2.2. Devolder’s Criticism of hiPSC research
hiPSC research enables the development of illness specific or patient specific pluripotent
stem cells without supply of oocytes and without the creation and destruction of embryos.
Thus, the central ethical objections seem to be removed. Contrary to widespread opinion,
Devolders thesis is that, regarding complicity with the destruction of human embryos,
hiPSC research is in a similar situation as hESC research. hiPSC research wouldn't be a solu‐
tion for the ethical problems connected to hESC research. She “aims to show that complicity
arguments against hESC research are prima facie inconsistent with accepting iPSC research as
it is currently done.” [13]. She suggests that, in a consistent way, both should be accepted or
rejected.
Devolder accuses hiPSC research of „promoting and condoning embryonic stem cell re‐
search“. The connections between hiPSC and hESC research seem to be similar to the con‐
nections between hESC research and embryo destruction: “Research on hESCs arguably
promotes embryo destruction through increasing demand; similarly iPSC research arguably
promotes hESC research in the same way. Engaging in hESC research arguably also implic‐
itly condones embryo destruction, in part because it involves significant interaction with
those who destroy embryos. Engaging in iPSC research involves even more significant inter‐
action with hESC researchers and thus, even more plausibly, implicitly condones hESC re‐
search.... Consistency requires that considerations of complicity are invoked in both cases.”
[13]. To a great extent, hiPSC research uses results of hESC research and therefore cannot
dissociate itself in a credible way from it. It seems to be contributing at least implicitly to
weakening the rejection of the destruction of embryos. If hESC research is opposed because
of complicity, according to Devolder, even hiPSC research must be seen as highly problem‐
atic, unless several modifications are implemented [13].
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4.3. Application of double effect reasoning
The argument of complicity legitimately asks for justification of the involvement of hESC re‐
search and in a more remote way hiPSC research in the destruction of human embryos, even
if researchers don’t perform it themselves. Double effect reasoning can give some general
guidance for performing research with including benefits from objected research in the past
and unintended side-effects in the future. Researchers must look back and consider, how
they think about the way cell lines, were obtained via the destruction of human embryos in
the past. Their research should be in consistency with this judgement. They should also
think about their contribution to further destruction of human embryos in the future. They
should pay attention to the way their research changes the attitudes of society. Both kinds of
consequences are part of the responsibility of researches to the extent they can be foreseen as
being in some direct or indirect, close or remote way connected to their scientific work.
The possible indirect and more remote consequences of hiPSC research on the destruction of
embryos cannot be denied. Who opposes the destruction of embryos for ethical reasons and
nevertheless participates in hiPSC research, can be justified in the line of double effect rea‐
soning only, if the rejection of the destruction of embryos and of possible problematic re‐
search in other countries is honest and proven by the attempt to minimize the effect of one’s
own research on promoting further embryo destruction. This objection should also be made
public in some clear and unambiguous way and should be accompanied by institutional or
legal precautions to avoid further embryo destruction and weakening of social attitudes.
The remaining indirect or remote contributing can be justified, if the benefit of the research
is adequately high.
4.4. Consistent solutions?
Devolder suggests 5 possible solutions [13]:
1. Rejection of hESC research, as well as hiPSC research.
2. Radical separation of the two research areas and “a change in the ways iPSC research is
done so that it would no longer involve complicity in hESC research.”
3. One could argue that hiPSC research is considerably more remote from the destruction
of human embryos and is, in this respect, less contributing to a weakening of the social
sensibility for the victims. In this respect, the "moral costs" could be justified more easi‐
ly.
4. Complicity arguments could be rejected or limited to cases "when one actually and sig‐
nificantly causally contributes to more embryo deaths", which is not the case for re‐
search with stem cells obtained by others.
5. The wrongness of the destruction of human embryos for important research areas could
be denied. In this case, the discussed complicity arguments would no longer be perti‐
nent to both ways of research.
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Rejection or radical separation of the two research areas are regarded as unappealing by De‐
volder, because this would be connected with considerable disadvantages for research. A
complete renunciation would retard important research projects and be a disadvantage for
potential patients hoping for new therapies. The renunciation would be a credible sign, but
a burden for others is a problematic proof of one’s own integrity.
A possible solution might be seen in a combination of Devolder’s suggestions 2 and 3. The
change in the ways hiPSC research is performed could be a radical constraint on the already
existing stem cell lines and a credible renunciation of obtaining new stem cell lines, or using
new ones from other countries, such as e.g. the European Group on Ethics proposes in its
opinion 22: “The derivation of new toti-potent cells or pluri-potent stem cell lines from do‐
nated pre-implantation human embryos or embryonic cells, or via nuclear reprogramming,
is not funded by the EU Research Programme.” [12]. If existing cell lines are sufficient for
the necessary comparison studies, research for therapeutic applications will not be ham‐
pered or retarded any way and no direct or near contribution to further destruction of em‐
bryos is remaining. If applicable regulations were found on a broad basis, protected in a
credible way and maintained in the long run, complicity arguments pertaining to embryo
destruction in the future wouldn’t be applicable anymore to hiPSC research. If, according to
the latest reports, the stage of pluripotency were dispensable for therapeutic applications
and adult stem cells could be developed into desired cell types without this step [7], even
the control studies with hESCs would become less important.
An important step in the direction of a limitation of research to existing hESC lines is the
European registry of existing hESC lines: “The European Commission has therefore decided
to establish and fund a European registry for human embryonic stem cell lines in order to
help researchers to optimise the hESC resources available, avoid duplication of work and/or
the creation of new cell lines where possible.” [12]. This kind of policy helps to avoid the
new destruction of embryos and enables transparency and credibility. Regulated in such a
way hiPSC has a good chance, not to contribute to a weakening of the social sensibility for
the victims of research and to changing attitudes to the dignity of human embryos. More
likely it is a step towards the opposite direction of more respect for human dignity.
Devolder’s suggestion 3 and 4 refer to the distinction of causally direct and indirect action.
The argument, “that the complicity arguments for rejecting hESC research are stronger than
the complicity arguments for rejecting iPSC research” [13] seems appropriate to us. Con‐
forming to the principle of double effect, the distinction between immediate consequences
and side effects, which are only wanted or accepted indirectly, opens a way to justify these
kind of consequences by proportionate reasons like the high benefit of research for fighting
diseases in the future. The remaining indirect and remote contribution to the destruction of
embryos can be estimated as balanced as long as it is not actively supported and possible
usage of results out of this kind of rejected research is not secretly hoped for.
Of course clarification is needed, which research objectives are regarded as adequately high
for the use of hESC lines. Therapeutical applications for humans can be regarded as ade‐
quate, also necessary control experiments for research with adult stem cells or hiPSCs. But
serious doubts appear in relation to non-therapeutic industrial applications like toxicity test‐
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ing to replace or reduce animal experimentation. Here the opinions are divided and depend‐
ing on the ethical background, using hESCs for applications like these are seen as a welcome
improvement by the one side [12, 66], or as a disproportionate means and a way of damag‐
ing human dignity that is not acceptable by the other side. The European Group on Ethics
stated clearly: “Although the Group is aware of the importance of respecting animal wel‐
fare, it is concerned that respect for human dignity may not be maintained when hESCs are
used in toxicity testing of industrial or other commercially produced chemicals not related
to drugs, such as cosmetics, or for replacement of animal testing. Therefore, particular atten‐
tion is to be drawn to this issue.” [12, 38, 69, 81]. The demand for further destruction of em‐
bryos would be increasing enormously and one can suppose that social attitudes would
really change in the long run, if cell lines derived from human embryos are used as com‐
modity, as raw material in industrial dimensions.
Devolder’s fourth solution, narrowing “complicity” to cases "when one actually and signifi‐
cantly causally contributes to more embryo deaths" [13], is no convenient way. It tends to
reduce researchers responsibility too much. Mediate and remote consequences of research
are part of the researchers’ moral responsibility. Abuse of discoveries and inventions, the
promotion of personally rejected methods and applications and even a problematic modifi‐
cation of social attitudes are relevant objects of responsibility, as far as they can be foreseen
and are enabled or promoted by one’s own activity. Taking responsibility of course doesn’t
mean being accused for every effect, but being willing to give a justification for accepting
unwanted side effects or long term consequences. If appropriate reasons are given, research
is justifiable despite these problems. Thus, the principle of double effect opens a way of
dealing with negative and unwanted side effects in a responsible way. Research does not
justify everything. But complicity is reduced to cases of voluntary and deliberate coopera‐
tion in the actions of others, which one claims to evaluate as morally wrong, (1) when there
is formal inner consent, even an implicit one, which is inconsistent, (2) when the cooperation
is so near and direct, that an inner rejection is not credible any more, or (3) when the dam‐
age and harm caused by the wrong action is not balanced by a proportionate high benefit.
Devolder’s fifth solution shows the necessary precondition for this discussion about com‐
plicity of hiPSC research, the determination of the destruction of human embryos for re‐
search purposes as morally wrong. This judgement mostly corresponds to a personalistic
position regarding the moral status of human embryos. Non-personalistic and gradualistic
positions don’t determine destruction of embryos as morally wrong generally or under spe‐
cific conditions. Of course they don’t have a problem with the discussed type of complicity.
As indicated in section 2 of this chapter, the ways of justifying the destruction of human em‐
bryos haven't been able to obtain an agreement until now: Denying or weakening of the mo‐
ral status and dignity of early human embryos, of research embryos or at least of surplus
IVF-embryos, always contains the risk of weakening this basic ethical argument of equal hu‐
man dignity in general and causing bad effects for humans in other stages of life. The sec‐
ond way, a justification of their destruction, as a legitimate way of killing without denying
dignity of human embryos, is not convincing and may cause similar side-effects.
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5. Conclusion
A consensus conferring the moral status of human embryos and the ethical evaluation of
creating and destructing human embryos hasn’t been achieved in the past and doesn't seem
probable in the near future. Attempts to justify the destruction of human embryos for re‐
search have not succeeded in answering the ethical objections in a sufficient and convincing
way. Since fundamental moral attitudes and convictions are concerned, it is adequate to im‐
pose the burden of proof on those, who advocate these ways of research. Liberty of research
finds its limits where the basic moral convictions of a society are violated.
In  areas  of  close  scientific  cooperation  the  search  for  agreement  in  fundamental  ethical
questions remains an urgent  challenge.  In  a  pluralistic  society,  despite  all  efforts  for  an
ethical basic consensus, it is possible that over a longer period of time, a consensus on a
certain moral question cannot be found. In such cases, the principle of tolerance is appli‐
cable  only  if  both  positions,  at  least,  share  a  common  basis  that  allows  to  include  the
contradicting positions as rational and consistent lines of reasoning. The problem is that
the positions regarding the moral status of human embryos don’t seem to be reconcilable
within a shared basic consensus.
In this situation, the only rational way seems to be the renunciation of any further destruc‐
tion of human embryos, a concentration on research with adult stem cells, iPSCs, and, where
necessary, with existing hESC-lines. According to the newest developments in stem cell re‐
search, this position doesn’t retard research for therapeutic objectives. It has a chance to
serve as a minimal consensus and, in the long run, possibly will prove to be the better way,
scientifically, ethically, in relation to social acceptability and maybe even economically.
The concern for common and strong ethical standards is part of the external responsibility of
science. Science itself is dependent on social agreement and legal certainty and would suffer
from a distrust and hostility towards science. In the end, there should be no difference be‐
tween ethical requirements and a science that is striving for an improvement of human liv‐
ing conditions in a sustainable and comprehensive way: "An ethics turned towards the
future and a politics of comprehensive ecological, social and humane sustainability are
guided by the insight, that there cannot be a double truth. Both, ethics and politics, should
be guided by the conviction that in a humane society the moral right in the long run will
also be the really beneficial for humans. Though one must realistically anticipate that single
groups and perhaps even societies will try to provide themselves with short-term advantag‐
es by overriding ethical boundaries, this won't be to the advantage of most people and the
world of future generations” [82].
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